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The Slovak Republic has undergone a turbulent 
development from the establishment of independent statehood to 
the present time. The independent state was established on 
January 1st, 1993 following the peaceful dissolution of the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic. We can classify it among the states 
with a relatively young democracy. In this respect it is similar to 
several states in the Balkan peninsula. 
This article deals with the issue of divison of powers in 
the Slovak Republic (Slovakia) in the context of actual 
constitutional development in the area relating to the 
Constitutional Court. The main focus of the paper is an evaluation 
of the practical application of the constitutional powers of the 
president and parliament in Slovakia in relation to Constitutional 
Court appointments. The authors offer a critical analysis of recent 
constitutional developments in this area, pointing out specific 
constitutional issues relating to this topic. The second part article 
focuses on a critical analysis of the draft of a Constitutional Act 
directly amending the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, which 
was introduced and submitted to parliament in 2020, though, at 
the time of this writing, the fate of this amendment and its final 
wording is unknown. The aim of the constitutional amendment is 
to make changes in the judicial system, especially concerning 
election of judges for the Constitutional Court  and criteria for 
candidates for this court. 
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1. Introduction: political and legal background of the dispute 
Slovakia as an independent unitary state came into existence on January 
1, 1993. Its Constitution1 had been adopted previously in September 1992, 
during the existence of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The state came 
into existence through a historical process. “ Unity does not rest on some 
abstract idea; it is the expression in practice of the relative homogeneity of a 
people. Just as the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political, 
so too does the concept of the constitution presuppose the state.“ (Loughlin, M., 
2013, p. 8) Slovakia has a parliamentary form of government and constitutional 
supremacy. The state powers are divided between the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic (legislative power), the government, the president (executive 
power) and the judiciary (judicial power).  
Understanding the issue of the selection of constitutional judges in the Slovak 
Republic requires consideration both of the text of the Constitution and of its 
background in the light of the recent development  of the country's political 
history. The next sections survey the circumstances that prompted 
dissatisfaction with the text in the Constitution, examination the distribution of 
powers among the branches and a review the reasons that led the Constitutional 
Court to adopt various infamous decisions. The Slovak Constitution provides 
for a parliamentary form of government. Constitutional theorists have discussed 
at length whether or not it is currently a more semipresidential system (Kresák, 
P., 1996; Albert, R., 2010, p. 225). 2 
The National Council, the only constitutional body of the Slovak 
Republic, is a unicameral legislature composed of 150 Members of Parliament 
(MPs). It has exclusive competence in the system of constitutional bodies to 
adopt the Constitution and to pass any amendments to it in the form of 
constitutional law. The Slovak Constitution (Art 84.4) prescribes that a three-
 
1 Constitution of the Slovak Republic published under no. 490/1992 Coll. 
2 Authors note: According to scholar Richard Albert in his paper, “Presidential values 
in parliamentary democracies”, semipresidentialism traces its origin to the 
Fifth French Republic.  the model having sprouted in the Slovak Republic, 
Poland, Russia, Hungary, and elsewhere since the end of the Cold War.  
The authors confirm there are certain characteristics similar to semi presidential system 
in the Slovak Republic such as the following: 1) citizens elect the president 
directly, as in presidential systems; (2) the president or the legislature appoints 
the head of government, usually a prime minister, who must retain the 
confidence of the Parliament, as in parliamentary systems; (3) the president 
may trigger elections by dissolving the legislature, but no cooperation by 
prime minister is needed (4) the president cannot veto legislation but can 
suggest that the legislature take a second look at legislation; (5) members of 
cabinet do not sit simultaneously in the legislature. 
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fifths majority of MPs, a qualified majority of 90 MPs, is needed for adopting 
or amending the Constitution. The Constitution has already been changed 18 
times since its inauguration, with the last direct amendment adopted on March 
28, 2019. If the National Council does not act on the constitution, constitutional 
law or on the amendment of the constitution or on the amendment of the 
constitutional law, neither the constitution nor its amendments is represented or 
replaced by any constitutional body, because only  the National Council has 
necessary democratic legitimacy.  
President of the Slovak Republic is directly elected by the people 
(Article 101 par.2), is not accountable to the National Council and has 
considerable powers (Article 102). Most of his/her powers are exercised 
individually. Only a few shared powers require the countersignature of the 
Prime Minister (Article 102 par. 2). He/she is performing his/her office 
according to his/her conscience and convictions (Article 101.1). When applying 
his or her powers enumerated in Article 102 par. 1 of the Constitution, the 
President has to respect and uphold the constitutional standards. The President 
of the Republic is therefore not merely the symbolic Head of the State but also 
in the reality has quite strong position in the state. Relationships between the 
National Council and President, between the directly elected president and 
government of the time, have proven to be problematic.  
The actual constitutional division of power in Slovakia has at least three 
weak points. The direct election of the president endows the head of the state 
with extraordinary powers that are not offset by the checks and balances typical 
of presidential systems. The executive is actually divided. It consists of a 
president who can claim an electoral mandate from the people of the entire 
nation and a prime minister who enjoys the support of a majority of the 
legislature. There is extremely high risk of crisis in problematic issues, 
especially those which are politically divisive. (Calabresi, S.G. & Larsen, J.L., 
1994) The President and the Prime Minister  each have an independent 
constituency to claim legitimacy and legitimate authority to act. A problem may 
arise when president and prime minister are from opposing political parties.  
The Constitutional Court does not mean merely a court acting in 
constitutional mode by interpreting a constitution or determining a 
constitutional issue, but a specialist court having only ‘constitutional’ 
jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court enjoys the right to carry out an abstract 
judicial review, that is, they can adjudicate on the constitutionality of a 
legislative act without a need for a specific case or a controversy to arise. The 
abstract norm control is a predominant method of exercising constitutional 
justice. The Court also has the power to exercise a concrete review. (Harding, 
A., Leyland, P. and Groppi T., 2008, p. 2, p. 219).The Constitutional Court of 
the Slovak Republic was established as the principal guardian of the 
Constitution (Art. 124). The Court is separate from the general judiciary and is 
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution in interpretive disputes. The Court 
is composed of thirteen judges appointed for non-renewable twelve-year terms 
and should serve as the last check in constitutional disputes. Its role is to 
mediate between the political branches.  
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Historically, Slovakia could draw on the modest Czechoslovak 
constitutional traditions when choosing a concept or a model for the selection 
of judges for the Constitutional Court. There were three different models to 
consider: 
i) an eclectic model of the First Republic Constitutional Court  of 
1920, in which the Constitutional Court consisted of seven 
members, three of whom were appointed by the President and two 
of whom were delegated from the ranks of the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Administrative Court. (Marečková,M., 2006, p.103) 
The Constitutional Court was created by bringing together 
members from different entities and different nomination and 
appointment mechanisms (Svák, J., Balog, B., 2018, p. 43-51) 
ii) the socialist model of exclusive parliamentary nomination, in 
which the Constitutional Court was, according to Art. 94 par. 3 of 
the Constitutional Act no. 143/1968 Coll. on the Czechoslovak 
Federation elected by the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic. The President was not involved in the process 
of appointing judges of the Constitutional Court. Since the 
Constitutional Court was the exclusive creation of parliament 
without the need for the involvement of the head of state, it 
corresponded to a power-political situation in which not even a 
formal division of power and balancing interests in the creation of 
a constitutional court was expected, and in principle no activity was 
expected of this constitutional court, 
iii) so called “Havel model” from the time of declining federation - 
Constitution Act no. 91/1991 Coll. on the Constitutional Court of 
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for the first time in Art. 10 
par. 2 stated that the appointment of judges of the Constitutional 
Court be made by the President on the proposal of both federal and 
national parliaments.  
 
In 1992, the legislature did not embark on the path of creating new or 
original model of the constitutional judiciary, but chose a structure that has 
remained same since then. In Art. 134 par. 2 of the Constitution states “The 
President of the Slovak Republic shall, on the nomination of the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic, appoint the judges of the Constitutional Court 
for a period of twelve years. The National Council of the Slovak Republic shall 
propose a double number of candidates who are to be appointed by the 
President of the Slovak Republic”.3 From 2001 the Constitutional Court consists 
of thirteen judges. The Court was originally established in 1993 with ten judges.  
Before adoption of the change by Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll. it was 
originally stipulated in Art. 134 (1) The Constitutional Court shall consist of 
 
3 All of the quotations in the text are translated into the English by the authors of this 
Article. 
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ten judges. (2) Judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed for seven years 
by the President of the Republic out of twenty persons nominated by the 
Parliament. As part of the proceedings in the parliament, a change was added 
that the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic will deal with 
constitutional complaints of natural and legal persons in senates with three 
members. The Senate shall act by a simple majority of its members. For this 
reason, the total number of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak 
Republic was subsequently adjusted from ten members to thirteen judges. The 
aim was to create four senates with three Member to decide. There should be 
appointed thirteen judges on the Court at all times to prevent it from working 
incapacity and disabling it from functioning. The Constitution stipulates in 
Article 131 (1) “The plenary meeting of the Constitutional Court decides by 
more than one-half of all judges. If such a majority is not reached, the motion 
is rejected.” It is necessary to hold the plenary session in case of a constitutional 
interpretation or judicial review of legislation. In other issues, such as deciding 
on the remaining matters, court operates in panels of three judges is sufficient. 
Decisions of the panel are made by a majority of the three members. 
The appointment or non-appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court 
resulted in an aim to change the constitution, first, without success, in 2018 and 
second in 2020, the success of which is yet to be determined. The regulation 
individual components of the appointment process should be a significant part 
of the proposed changes. The main ambition of this change was originally the 
improvement of the quality of candidates, the transparent selection process, the 
elimination of the influence of the current government majority and the 
increasec of the legitimacy and credibility of the constitutional court as such.  
 
2. Selection and appointment procedures of Constitutional Judges in the 
light of political games 
The question of the quality of judicial candidates of  the Slovak 
Constitutional Court and the criteria they have to fulfill has been discussed in 
depth in Slovakia for several years. As a starting point for this discussion, one 
may regard the rejection of five of the proposed six candidates for the three 
vacant positions of constitutional judge by the President in July 2014. More 
than three years later there were two judge positions in the Constitutional Court. 
The whole process finished up before the Constitutional Court, which adopted 
three decisions concerning the appointment of constitutional judges. (Decision 
of Constitutional Court of the SR file no. III. ÚS 571/2014; PL. ÚS 45/2015; I. 
ÚS 575/2016) These decisons of the Constitutional Court were controversial. 
These decisions were attached by strongly differing opinions of the overrideded 
judges and subject to professional and public criticism. In addition, one 
proceeding before the Constitutional Court was rejected before issueing another 
decision on the merits (Giba, M., Baraník, K., 2018). 
 Two constitutional bodies participate in filling empty seats of the 
Constitutional Court. The National Council has the power to select and propose 
candidates for the positions. The President is the only constitutional body 
empowered to appoint the candidate to be the judge. The National Council 
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proposes a list of candidates consisting of twice the required number of judges. 
According to the dictate of the constitution, the president is bound by this 
proposed list and has a free hand only in the selection within the proposed group 
of candidates. (Drgonec, J., 2019, p. 1620) At the same time, the President can 
cooperate with the National Council and thus influence the selection of those 
candidates who are given to him for the selection. He can do so in an official or 
unofficial way. However, if the National Council has already made its selection 
and submitted twice the number of candidates to the President, the President is 
obliged to select from among these candidates.  
The appointment of Constitutional judges is not the only personal 
power of the respected constitutional authority the exercise of which requires 
the interaction of the the National Council and the President. This allows for an  
opportunity for controversy or a direct dispute over the exercise of their mutual 
creative power. (Balog, B., Trellová, L., 2010) The text of the  Constitutional 
(Art. 102 par. 1 a) with Art. 134 par. 2) does not offer any extending of 
presidential discretion, or limits.  
As has already been mentioned, a constitutional drama started in 2014. 
Before 2014 presidents always appointed half of the number of candidates 
elected by the National Council. National Council in its session from 3 April 
2014 to 15 May 2014 adopted a resolution in which it proposed six candidates 
for the three positions of available for Constitutional Court judges and resented 
this list to the President of the Slovak Republic. Andrej Kiska as a newly elected 
Slovak President refused to appoint candidates nominated by the parliament 
elected prior to his election and required the National Council to submit a new 
list. The composition of the Constitutional Court became the subject of a 
political struggle between the President and the Prime Minister as a leaders of 
two respective political parties.  
A similar situation occurred in 2016, when the President did not appoint 
any of the five candidates proposed by the National Council for three vacant 
seats to the Constitutional Court. The rejected candidates turned to the 
Constitutional Court with constitutional complaint concerning breach of the 
fundamental constitutional laws by the negative act of the Head of the State. 
The Constitutional Court adopted decision III ÚS 571/2014 on March 17, 2015 
in which it confirmed that President Kiska had violated the rights of the three 
nominees by denying them access to elected and other public offices. The 
judgement was followed by another decision of the Constitutional Court 
confirming infringement of the fundamental rights of other candidates in 2017. 
Followingly this, the President appointed judges to all  remaining positions of 
judges of the Constitutional Court. 
Not only did the President’s decisions after July 2016 breach the 
Constitution and weaken the institutional authority of the Constitutional Court, 
but these actions ultimately prolonged the Constitutional Court’s paralysis, with 
one entire Court session being inoperable. Such a situation has serious 
consequences for the functionality of the Court. The increasing workload of the 
Court was distributed among fewer judges, which caused lengthier 
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proceedings, and an increased chance that decisions on merits could not be 
reached, as the Constitution requires the consent of a minimum of seven judges. 
This means, on the one hand, greater prospects for the parliamentary majority 
winning a case before the Constitutional Court, and, on the other hand, less 
scrutiny and limited effectiveness of judicial review for anyone else. (Ľalík, T., 
2016)4 
The non-appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court by the 
President from among the candidates proposed by the National Council pointed 
to tensions between the head of state and parliament. The existence of tensions 
and different types of disputes between several branches of state power are 
natural and stem from the different roles and powers of these branches in the 
constitutional system. In a constructive way, they contribute to keeping the 
constitutional system in balance. However, when one constitutional body 
exercises or does not exercise its powers in such a way as to interfere with the 
essence of the existence and activities of another constitutional body, the 
existence of tension is destructive to the constitutional system, its functioning 
and stability.  
The non-appointment of the Constitutional Court is reflected in the 
reduced performance of the Constitutional Court, as well as the real limitation 
of the exercise of its powers and reduction in the level of protection of 
constitutionality. The position of the Constitutional Court as an independent 
judicial body for the protection of constitutionality is specific, as it is the only 
constitutional body with an explicitly granted power to protect constitutionality, 
making its position specific. It has a unique and ultimate responsibility to 
protect Constitution in the Slovak Republic. 
The role of the Constitutional Court is to assess the exercise of the 
President's powers impartially, independently and objectively within the 
protection of constitutionality, respecting the constitutional status of the 
Constitutional Court as the guardian of constitutionality, which includes the 
 
4 Authors‘ note: Discussion concerning certain part of the so called Constitutional 
drama took place also at I-CONnect Symposium: The Slovak Constitutional 
Court Appointments Case, For details see: Drugda, Š.: Introduction (available 
online: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/symposium-slovak-
appointments-case-introduction/); Drugda, Š.: Intermezzo to the 
Constitutional Conflict in Slovakia: A Case Critique (available online: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/symposium-slovak-appointments-
case-drugda/); Domin, M.: The President’s Appointments (available online: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/symposium-slovak-appointments-
case-domin/); Baraník, K.: Perplexities of the Appointment Process Resolved 
by Means of “Fire and Fury” (available online: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/symposium-slovak-appointments-
case-baranik/); Ľalík, T.: Born is the King: The Day When Effective Judicial 
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protection of constitutional values. The President with a constitutional 
obligation within his decision making to ensure the proper functioning of 
constitutional bodies (Article 101 para. 1 of the Constitution), is limited by the 
constitutional imperative expressed in Art. 2 par. 2 of the Constitution, i.e. to 
act only on the basis of the Constitution, within its limits and scope and in the 
manner provided by law. The exercise of all powers, including appointments, 
exercised by the President must be in accordance with those constitutional 
norms which are decisive for their exercise. 
 
3. Constitutional Amendment draft 2020  
There have been contentious political battles over the Constitutional 
Court vacancies before and text of the Constitution provides much less 
guidance than might be expected. Since the Constitution of the Slovak Republic 
was not amended in 2018 to address this issue and since there have been calls 
for such constitutional changes from the people, the National Council, elected 
in February 2020 and equipped with a constitutional majority, introduced a new 
draft amendment to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Amendment 
proposal related to the most important constitutional provisions, including 
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, and 
appointment of its judges. Proposals for constitutional amendment arose as 
a popular demand elaborated by the government as a political project. In 2019, 
for the first time took place so-called public hearing of candidates for judge of 
the Constitutional Court. It was organised under the supervision of the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. 
The public hearing has also found its place in the forthcoming amendment to 
the Constitution, which stipulates that should be already an obligatory part of 
the process of selecting candidates for judges of the Constitutional Court. 
During the hearing, candidates are subjected to a number of questions 
concerning their professional life, professional knowledge and opinions, 
political past or other.  
When it comes to selection and appointment of constitutional judges, 
three different models can be distinguished. (Harding, A., Leyland, P. and 
Groppi T., 2008, p. 12-14) First model places the decision on appointment 
entirely in the hands of the legislature, in many cases involving special 
parliamentary election committee. Under the second model, selection and 
appointment are joint prerogative of the legislature and the (head of the) 
executive. Different countries have developed different ways in which 
cooperation between the political institutions is organised. Under the third 
model, the power to select constitutional justices is distributed among several 
public institutions, which, independent of each other, appoint a portion of the 
constitutional bench. (De Visser, M., 2015, p. 206-209) 
 There is a steady decline in the public trust in the judiciary in European 
countries, so it important to improve the Constitutional framework as much as 
is possible in reaction to former political struggle. The Slovak government 
recently presented a draft amendment to the Constitution of the Slovak 
Republic. Newly drafted  Art. 134 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak 
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Republic only slightly changes the former model of selection and appointment 
of constitutional judges, using the second model whereby selection and 
appointment are joint prerogative of the legislature and the Head of the State. 
According to the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the Slovak 
Republic from 2020, the amended Art. 134, paragraph 2 shall be as follows: 
“(2) Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed by the President of 
the Slovak Republic on the proposal of the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic. The National Council of the Slovak Republic shall propose a double 
number of candidates who are to be appointed by the President of the Slovak 
Republic.; The proposals shall be voted on by the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic in public, after hearing the persons proposed by the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic. If the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
does not select the required number of candidates for judges of the 
Constitutional Court within two months from the expiry of the term of office of 
a judge of the Constitutional Court or within six months from the termination 
of the position of a judge of the Constitutional Court for other reasons, the 
President of the Slovak Republic may appoint judges of the Constitutional 
Court from proposed candidates. "  
The amendment to the Constitution introduces an old-new model of the 
method of selecting judges of the Constitutional Court. However, it contains 
minor changes that may cause some variations in the strength of the legal status 
of the highest constitutional bodies. Once again, the election of judges of the 
Constitutional Court comes into consideration as a result of cooperation 
between the National Council and the President of the Slovak Republic. In this 
respect, the legislature seems to consider the existing method of selecting 
judges of the Constitutional Court to be sufficiently appropriate in terms of the 
legitimacy of power. It has the nature of the fundamental dilemma related to 
the Court being the “guardian of the Constitution”, especially as this court 
exercises the power to invalidate democratically enacted laws on the basis of 
their own understanding of constitutional rights. The normative concept of 
political legitimacy refers to some benchmark of acceptability or justification 
of political power or authority and possibly obligation. According to scholars 
(Rawls, J., 1993, Ripstein, A., 2004) legitimacy refers, in the first instance, to 
the justification of coercive political power. Whether a political body such as a 
state is legitimate and whether citizens have political obligations towards it 
depends, in this view, on whether the coercive political power that the state 
exercises is justified. In a widely held alternative view, legitimacy is linked to 
the justification of political authority. (Peter, F., 2017) Ripstein has argued that 
much of the contemporary literature on political legitimacy has been dominated 
by a focus on the justification of authority, rather than coercive political power 
(Ripstein, A., 2004). But as the “dynastic” source of legitimacy is replaced with 
“democratic legitimacy,” the judiciary is faced with a new reality that the 
Constitutional Court must be able to stand up to an interpretive-political dispute 
with parliament (Schmitt, C., 1926, p.31). 
 
 
Lívia TRELLOVÁ, Boris BALOG   
 
116                Balkan Social Science Review Vol.16, December 2020, 107-125 
 
From what sources do the judges draw their legitimacy? The 
Constitutional Court and its judges draw mainly from institutional sources to 
generate judicial legitimacy. The democratic state is based on the idea of 
representative democracy, with elections being the source of legitimacy for 
state power. But not all public authorities are directly legitimized by elections. 
We can therefore also speak of indirect legitimacy, where non-elected public 
authorities draw their legitimacy from a directly elected body. This is so-called 
“chain of legitimacy “ through which non-elected bodies derive their legitimacy 
from an elected body, or from another non-elected body, which derives its 
position from a directly elected body. This applies to judges of the 
Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. (Domin, M., Trellová, L., 2019, 
p. 37 ) The idea of a ‘chain of legitimation’ can be characterized as a “core 
concept of German constitutional law” (Bogdandy, A., 2004, p. 902). The idea, 
expressed by the metaphor, of an uninterrupted ‘chain of legitimacy’ or a 
‘democratic chain of legitimation’, rests on the assumption that public decisions 
derive their legitimacy from democratically elected representatives of the 
people. All governmental bodies acting with official authority have to be 
appointed directly or indirectly by the people and, at least in principle, it must 
be possible to dismiss the appointed representative. One particularly important 
feature of this metaphor is the postulate that the chain is complete. In order to 
secure the legitimacy of public authority, the chain has to be uninterrupted. 
Each individual government official must be connected according to the order 
of the chain. From each individually appointed government official, a chain of 
individual acts of appointment has to lead back to the people as the bearer of 
sovereignty. Only an uninterrupted chain guarantees the legitimacy of the 
institutional system (Nullmeier, F., Pritzlaff, T., 2010, p. 2; Böckenförde, 1991, 
p. 302).  
The legitimacy of the Constitutional Court is derivative; the 
constitutional court judges are appointed by a directly elected President upon 
the proposal of candidates made selected by the directly elected National 
Council. However, accountability is less pronounced. If one looks at terms of 
office, constitutional judges serve 12 years, much longer than the members of 
parliament who serve four years or the president who serves five years. Further, 
the visibility of individual judges’ actions to the general public is much lower. 
Consequently, constitutional courts’ authority to have a final say over the 
legislative choices of parliamentary majorities might cast some doubts about 
the very concept of constitutional review. (Harding, A., Leyland, P. and Groppi 
T., 2008, p. 219-220) 
There is no doubt that the model of selection based on the idea of joint 
prerogatives of the National Council and the President is, from a legitimacy 
point of view, an appropriate solution. When perceiving this question from the 
point of view of the chain of legitimacy, where the concept of legitimacy is 
based on the idea that “all public acts ought to be retraceable to the democratic 
will of the people” (Keller, H., 2008, p. 257), this model is definitely adequate. 
Both constitutional institutions, the National Council and the president are 
directly elected by the people. However, we believe that the closer a public 
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authority in an imaginary ‘chain of legitimacy’ to the people themselves as a 
source of power, the higher is its legitimacy. The Constitutional Court has to be 
effective in the interventions in the choices and actions of political branches of 
government, in particular, the National Council and the Government or the 
President. Deciding upon the issues concerning the existence of political parties 
or adjudicating conflicts between state institutions have been important aspects 
of the courts’ activity. Another issue can come into question: Although the 
deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic are considered to be 
representatives of all the Slovak citizens and their actions are attributable to the 
citizens as their own, in terms of the theory of representation (Kysela, J., 2014, 
p.105), at least, doubts can be expressed as to whether selected candidates for 
constitutional judges actually correspond to the will and ideas of the citizens. 
In our opinion, the existing model for the selection of the constitutional judges, 
probably most optimally fills the set of requirements from the point of view of 
legitimacy. The other two models lack a constitutional tradition or the courage 
of the legislature to enforce them. 
 Draft amendment to the Constitution specifies in Art. 134, par. 2 that 
the National Council of the Slovak Republic propose double the number of 
candidates for judges to be appointed by the President (in the text also known 
as a "double number rule"). The government's draft amendment to the 
Constitution of the Slovak Republic provides the President with the opportunity 
to appoint judges of the Constitutional Court from a selected list of candidates, 
even if the requirement of double number of candidates is not met. The 
proposed amendment provides for a solution in case the parliament does not 
select a sufficient number of candidates for judges of the Constitutional Court 
In the following section, we will analyze two possible scenarios - how 
the situation could develop with an insufficient number of candidates proposed 
by the parliament and how it would affect the position of individual 
constitutional bodies participating in this process of personal creation of the 
Constitutional Court.  
First, the President shall be given the opportunity, but not the 
obligation, to appoint judges of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic 
in case The National Council proposes less than twice the number of candidates. 
It can be regarded as an exclusive decision of the President whether to appoint 
judges of the Constitutional Court from an incomplete list of candidates, or to 
wait until the National Council provides for all or at least a higher number of 
candidates. In case of a proposed incomplete list of candidates there exist the 
possibility for the President to appoint these judges, but there is no obligation. 
It does not necessarily lead to an interference in the mutual relations between 
the National Council and the President, nor does their relationship change 
significantly in terms of power, in favour of one or the other. 
The president seems to enjoy considerable discretion in case the National 
Council does not fully exercise and fulfill its authority. Susequently the 
President has no obligation to exercise his discretionary power in appointing 
the judges. The scope of action for the President is slightly wider but it does not 
represent a significant strengthening of his power. President is entitled 
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to exercise his own evaluation of the situation and decide not to appoint the 
judge from incomplete list of candidates, which can also be helpful and result 
in a list with more high-quality candidates to be delivered. This case tips the 
scales in favour of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, which, in order 
to enforce its candidates, would deliberately select an incomplete number of 
candidates for the seats in the Constitutional Court. Using such an approach 
towards the selection can be a method for the National Council to make the 
President accept candidates and appoint them. Because even if the president has 
the choice of whether or not to appoint, in the situation of an incomplete number 
of candidates, he/she still has to comply with the constitutional requirement 
expressed in his/her constitutional obligation by his/her decision-making to 
ensure the proper functioning of constitutional bodies. 
The fear-inducing situation of a lack of the constitutional judges, when 
there is not sufficient number of judges appointed, thus endagering the 
functioning of the Constitutional Court, can theoretically happen again. The 
question necessarily appears in this situation when the National Council would 
select as many candidates as there are vacancies at constitutional bench in order 
to allow the creation of the plenary quorum of the Constitutional Court, which 
would allow the normal functioning of the Constitutional Court and the 
possibility to decide in plenary as envisaged by the Constitution. We assume 
that in this case, the president has no choice. The President would hardly justify 
the non-appointment of candidates proposed by Parliament. This also applies 
to cases where the President has doubts about the qualities of the candidates 
offered and would normally reject them. 
We can ask another question: Is “the rule of selecting half “ applicable 
when an incomplete number of candidates is offered or is there any other 
numerical rule governing presidential possibility to appoint judges of the 
Constitutional Court from the incomplete list? When thinking about 
possibilities, the number of candidates elected by the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic may be completely different from the number of vacancies at 
the Court, limited only to maximum double of vacant seats. There are three 
ways to deal with the President’s decision to appoint a judge from an 
incomplete number of candidates. The President may appoint as many judges 
as he is personally convinced of their qualities, up to a maximum of vacant 
seats,without being limitated by “the rule of selecting half”. On the contrary, 
he/she is obliged to appoint as many judges as to occupy vacancies to the extent 
permitted by the number of proposed candidates. Or he/she is obliged to appoint 
as many judges as to occupy vacancies respecting “the rule of selecting half”. 
When the President uses his authority to appoint judges of the 
Constitutional Court from an incomplete list, he/she again has the opportunity 
to freely decide on the scope of appointment, i.e. how many judges to be 
appointed. The President can exercise his/her authority and nominate as many 
candidates as he is convinced are suitable for the position of judge.This may be 
due to the fact that the president does not respect double number rule. In such 
a case, we can theoretically assume that it would strengthen his/her position in 
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the scope of free discretion in the creation of the Constitutional Court of the 
Slovak Republic. 
The analyzed possibilities of the use of power by the National Council 
and the President may result in different constitutional consequences, where a 
partial strengthening of the position of one of them occurs. These are two 
almost opposite partial constitutional situations of the position of the highest 
constitutional bodies. Under the influence of first situation the primary 
possibility of the president turns into his/her subsequent obligation to appoint 
judges of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in the maximum 
possible extent, and position of the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
would be strengthened. The second situation is based on the fact that the 
parliament does not supply the president with the complete number of 
candidates. The reasons for such a procedure can be various: from political 
disagreements to a lack of candidates. If the president receives an incomplete 
number of candidates elected and offered from parliament, the question arises 
as to whether the president is required to nominate half of the candidates, or 
whether the president can act with the discretion and judgment with regards to 
the candidates, which may result in the appointment of a number of judges who 
meet the president's preferences.  
In such a case, the position of the head of state is slightly strengthened 
at the expense of the parliament, which is necessarily expected to allow other 
candidates for judges of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.  
These model situations, which may occur on the basis of the draft of 
constitutional amendmend, create a slight strengthening of the position, 
sometimes for parliament and another time for the president. Analysed 
situations of strengthening of the position of one of the two participating 
constitutional bodies do not represent a significant intervention in the 
constitutional system for either of them.  
It can be stated that the amendment to the Constitution is in this respect 
non-invasive in terms of the content of the constitutional law. It is only a small 
inovation to the constitutional mechanism for the election of judges of the 
Constitutional Court, when the parliament does not elect a sufficient number of 
necessary candidates. As can be seen from the analysis, the legislature cannot 
completely rule out that the situation similar the past will be repeated. In each 
variant of the system, current and revised, for occupying the position of judge 
of the Constitutional Court, it is possible not to appoint as many judges as is 
necessary. The legislature rejected another model of the manner of occupying 
the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.  On the other hand, in addition 
to the advantage of a high degree of legitimacy for judges of the Constitutional 
Court, this system has the disadvantage as possible political rivalry between 
National Council and the President, which may also reflect the real preferences 
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4. Conclusion 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court in Slovakia was closely 
connected to a regime change in the early 1990s and to transformation of the 
form of statehood. This constitutional institution should be established and 
occupied with respect to its guardian role and reflecting upon its continued 
relevance. 
The above mentioned considerations on the appointment of judges of 
the Constitutional Court and perhaps a suitable model for their appointment, 
political disputes connected with this Court, and the search for a solution point 
out how fragile the constitutional system is. No provision of the Constitution is 
isolated and any change is reflected in the entire constitutional system. 
Different ways of appointing judges to the Constitutional Court affect the 
position and strength of the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court was established as a judicial body with the 
competence to protect constitutionality. The Constitutional Court is 
independent of the legislature and the executive, the general courts and all other 
public authorities. It has a legal duty to ensure that the Constitution is respected 
in all circumstances, even if the infringment is made by a public authority, 
including the Parliament or the President. The search for a suitable way of 
appointing judges of the Constitutional Court must therefore respect the 
requirement of protection of constitutionality. The aim is not to strengthen the 
power of the President in the constitutional system, the Parliament or their 
mutual relationship. 
 Another important issue to deal with for the constituion-maker is to 
guarantee sufficient level of democratic legitimacy for the guardian of the 
Constituion. This question gained importance in light of the constitutional 
drama from 2014-2017. At that time, citizens took the position of hostages to 
the political struggle for creation of the Constitutional Court. After the change 
in the distribution of political forces in the National Council and the change in 
the position of Head of State, the legislature brought a long-awaited new ideas 
to change the way constitutional judges are appointed. However, no  model 
other than the established model of the creation of the Constitutional Court was 
introduced, so the system is  still a joint process of cooperation between 
Parliament and the President. It can be beneficial (if the parliament approves 
the amendment to the Constitution from  2020) to fine-tune small areas that 
have not yet been constitutionally regulated in this process, such as the 
procedure in the case of an incomplete list of candidates.  
Another minor positive improvement might be the mandatory public 
hearing of candidates for judges. This legislative change has a short history. 
Legislative reforms introduced in the year 2018 were primarily meant to 
improve the legitimacy of the selection process. The method that the Slovak 
Ministry of Justice chose to achieve this goal was to increase, in various ways, 
the sum of public information available about Constitutional Court candidates. 
The introduction of selection hearings was one element of the reform that 
contributed to the publicity of the upcoming appointment. Selection hearings 
allow new information about the life, quality, ideology, and merit of candidates 
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to be acquired through questioning. However, other partial improvements 
contributed to achieving this goal and helped set the stage for the selection 
hearings. (Drugda, Š., 2019, p. 29-30). At the same time, however, we are not 
convinced that it is necessary to introduce this at the constitutional level. 
However, we do appreciate this as an element that should contribute to 
transparency and increase the quality of the selection of judges of the 
Constitutional Court. 
In this paper, we did not deal comprehensively with the proposed 
amendment to the Constitution from 2020 and the process of creation of the 
Constitutional Court, in the sense that we did not pay attention to adjusting the 
criteria for the post of constitutional judge and other details. In the offered 
analysis of the model of selection of judges of the Constitutional Court, we 
came to the conclusion that the draft amendment to the Constitution would not 
significantly affect the scope of the legal status of the most important 
constitutional bodies such as the President and Parliament. On the other hand, 
the "cosmetic adjustments" in the constitution can help to increase the 
efficiency of the selection process and its controllability by the public. 
However, the legislature has not developed a wider public and professional 
debate on possible ways of changing the model of appointing judges of the 
Constitutional Court and it could be of great help. 
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